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Abstract
Radical innovation and disruptive technologies are frequently heralded as a solution to delivering higher
quality, lower cost health care. According to the literature on disruption, local hospitals and physicians
(incumbent providers) may be unable to competitively respond to such "creative destruction" and alter
their business models for a host of reasons, thus threatening their future survival. However, strategic
management theory and research suggest that, under certain conditions, incumbent providers may be
able to weather the discontinuities posed by the disrupters. This article analyzes 3 disruptive innovations
in service delivery: single-specialty hospitals, ambulatory surgical centers, and retail clinics. We first
discuss the features of these innovations to assess how disruptive they are. We then draw on the
literature on strategic adaptation to suggest how incumbents develop competitive responses to these
disruptive innovations that assure their continued survival. These arguments are then evaluated in a field
study of several urban markets based on interviews with both incumbents and entrants. The interviews
indicate that entrants have failed to disrupt incumbent providers primarily as a result of strategies
pursued by the incumbents. The findings cast doubt on the prospects for these disruptive innovations to
transform health care.
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Abstract

Radical innovation and disruptive technologies are frequently heralded as a solution to delivering higher
quality, lower cost health care. According to the literature on disruption, local hospitals and physicians (incumbent providers) may be unable to competitively respond to such ‘‘creative destruction’’ and alter their
business models for a host of reasons, thus threatening their future survival. However, strategic management
theory and research suggest that, under certain conditions, incumbent providers may be able to weather the
discontinuities posed by the disrupters. This article analyzes 3 disruptive innovations in service delivery: singlespecialty hospitals, ambulatory surgical centers, and retail clinics. We first discuss the features of these innovations to assess how disruptive they are. We then draw on the literature on strategic adaptation to suggest how
incumbents develop competitive responses to these disruptive innovations that assure their continued survival.
These arguments are then evaluated in a field study of several urban markets based on interviews with both
incumbents and entrants. The interviews indicate that entrants have failed to disrupt incumbent providers
primarily as a result of strategies pursued by the incumbents. The findings cast doubt on the prospects for these
disruptive innovations to transform health care. (Population Health Management 2011;14:69–77)

decades to become commonplace because of perceptions of
lower effectiveness. The procedure (involving a coronary
stent) was initially limited to less complex cases, but since
has partially replaced invasive heart bypass surgery performed by cardiothoracic surgeons. LASIK eye surgery was
invented during the 1960s but took nearly 3 decades to
overcome professional skepticism, receive Food and Drug
Administration approval, and become commonplace. LASIK
has rendered obsolete the products and services provided by
lens manufacturers and opticians and, in some states, is now
being performed by optometrists instead of opthalmic surgeons. In both cases, practitioners needed to negotiate a steep
learning curve to achieve higher quality results.
For such products, profit is based not so much on the
consumer’s greater willingness to pay but on substantially
lower production costs and the increased convenience to the
customer. Over the past 10 years, Christensen and colleagues
have argued that disruptive organizational models of delivery are needed to improve the affordability and convenience of health care.2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9 They cite single-specialty
hospitals (SSHs), ambulatory surgery centers (ASCs), and
retail clinics (RCs) as illustrations of disruption.8,10

Introduction
Creative destruction, radical innovation,
and disruptive technology

J

oseph Schumpeter long ago described the process of
‘‘creative destruction’’ whereby entrepreneurial entrants
to an industry take advantage of opportunities afforded by
new technologies, organization models, and products that
incumbents cannot.1 These innovations are labeled ‘‘radical
innovations’’ because they challenge the status quo, constitute new and risky ways of doing business, and typically
emerge at the periphery of the market or industry. As a result, the new entrants develop a competitive advantage over
the incumbents and earn higher profits based on lower
production costs or the customer’s willingness to pay a
higher price.
More recently, Clay Christensen identified a subset of innovations that creatively destroy established markets: disruptive technologies. Several examples of disruptive
innovation developed in health care delivery during the late
20th century. Balloon angioplasty, performed by interventional cardiologists, developed in the 1970s but took nearly 2
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SSHs provide largely identical services to inpatient departments in general community hospitals, just as ASCs do
in lieu of hospital outpatient surgery departments. Both tend
to treat less complex patients, provide narrower services, and
enjoy less backup capability. RCs, which serve as an alternative to primary care physicians’ offices, deliver a narrower
set of services that are provided by nurse practitioners to
patients with and without health insurance.
Radical and disruptive elements that challenge incumbents
What makes these models disruptive compared to status
quo models of delivery? SSHs, ASCs, and RCs offer existing
services and products at lower intensity and lower/comparable quality than their rivals but more than compensate by
sharply reducing price.11,12 They also share the following
disruptive characteristics: simplicity, customer convenience,2
substitution of lower cost manpower (nurse practitioners
over physicians, primary care physicians over specialists),
substitution of lower cost sites of care (outpatient centers
over hospitals, home care over office-based care), appeal to
new or the lower end of market customers, creation of new
markets and/or business models, and lower initial performance but ultimately quality enhancement.
These innovations threaten the business models of incumbent providers, who may find it difficult to respond for
several reasons. First, they may suffer cognitive barriers and
fail to recognize the implications of the radical innovation
(eg, resulting from a lack of information or evidence base
regarding the disruption). Second, they may recognize the
implications but choose not to respond (eg, because of the
challenge of cultural change, rigidity of their procedures and
routines, and organizational inertia). Third, they may recognize the implications but be unable to match the competencies of the new entrants. This may arise from (a) their
higher cost operations that cause them to incur losses in the
new areas; (b) a near-exclusive focus on their current customers at the expense of seeking out newer ones with lower
cost services; and (c) the fact that the disruptive innovation
conflicts with their core strategy and thus inhibits investment
in disruptive areas. Instead of competing with disruptive
innovation, incumbents resist, oppose, or seek to discredit
them.
How strong is the challenge posed by radical and
disruptive elements?
Despite the characterization above, several considerations
suggest that SSHs, ASCs, and RCs may not be that disruptive. First, contrary to the disruption thesis, there may be
little substitution taking place, other than the site of care. The
same practitioners tend to be involved regardless of where
the care is performed. For example, the same orthopedic
surgeons perform procedures in both ASCs and hospital
outpatient surgical units, just as the same nurse practitioners
may see patients in a RC, a primary care physician’s office, or
at the patient’s residence. Moreover, both traditional and
disruptive organizational sites (particularly SSHs and ASCs)
utilize roughly the same techniques with small differences in
the degree of standardization, automation, routinization, or
commoditization taking place in the latter. Comparable results observed in one study of RCs may be due to that
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study’s focus on a site possessing an electronic medical record, uncommon in the offices of primary care physicians.14
There are potentially important differences nevertheless.
While the same providers might see patients in both traditional and disruptive settings and treat them in similar ways,
there are fewer consulting colleagues and less technical
backup in the disruptive sites, which may limit the overall
quality of care that can be provided. Counterbalancing any
potential quality differences is the fact that patients seen in
disruptive settings tend to be lower severity cases that typically require less backup.15
Second, there are few differences in the performance attributes targeted by disruptive organizational sites. ASCs
and outpatient surgeries offer patients roughly the same set
of valued benefits, just as RCs may offer similar levels of care
in routine visits as do primary care physicians and pediatricians. However, ASCs and RCs potentially trade off
greater patient convenience (eg, easier access, shorter waiting
times) for less technical backup (eg, emergency services) and
provider skill on-site (eg, potentially missed diagnoses). To
manage the clinical risk effectively, ASCs and RCs may tend
to treat less complex cases. Although patients with health
insurance coverage tend to be price insensitive, they may
trade off a small probability of inadequate care in the event
of a complication for the certainty of greater convenience and
lower price by seeking treatment in such settings.
Third, there is no evidence that traditional providers
(whether hospitals or physicians) offer innovation that
overshoots the needs of average customers, which creates a
niche opportunity for disrupters. Instead, the disruptive sites
often induce demand for their services and cherry-pick the
healthier patients—for example, as physicians refer their
surgical patients to sites in which they have a financial interest, or RC operators locate their sites in retail establishments frequented by active shoppers—leaving the traditional
sites with higher severity cases.15,16 As a result, the disruptive innovators target their care at simpler cases and lower
risk patients for treatment in technologically less sophisticated sites (which may entail less backup and potentially
lower quality), leaving the more complex and higher severity
patients in traditional sites with such backup.
Fourth, most provider sites—both disruptive and traditional—tend to avoid lower end customer segments, such as
Medicaid patients and the uninsured, who are associated
with lower reimbursement and higher levels of severity. One
exception is RCs, which attract uninsured patients who can
pay the out-of-pocket cost for a visit. As a result, such lowend care may not exert much of an impact on the volume and
business models of providers in traditional settings.
Recent studies and reviews of the literature support this
view that presumptively disruptive innovations like SSHs,
ASCs, and RCs are, in fact, not that disruptive. The studies
reveal that SSHs (a) have been consistently engaged in patient cream skimming, (b) target patients with more generous
insurance coverage, (c) are no more efficient than general
medical-surgical hospitals, (d) may in fact incur higher costs
per case, (e) have quality outcomes that are the same, lower,
or higher than community hospitals, and ( f ) do not adversely affect the revenues of community hospitals.17,18,19
The available research literature on ASCs also suggests favorable risk selection with no overall differences in quality
compared to hospital outpatient departments, and no impact
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on hospital margins (K. Carey, J.F. Burgess, G.J. Young,
unpublished data, 2010).20,21,22,23
Finally, recent studies of RCs have found that they also
engage in cream skimming the less severely ill patients but
deliver less costly care, controlling for severity.24,25 There is
some evidence regarding quality standards practiced in such
clinics and comparable levels of quality of care relative to
physician offices.11,14,26,27 However, the clinics seem to attract patients lacking a primary care physician, suggesting
they may serve as more of a safety net provider than a disrupter.15,28 There is also some skepticism whether retail
clinics can expand into more complex types of care and retain their current value proposition, thus limiting their ability
to disrupt the status quo providers.22
Overall, the scope for disruptive innovations in health care
may be limited because patients find it notoriously difficult
to assess the clinical dimensions of the medical services they
buy. In fact, many patients use price and the quality of
nonclinical dimensions of care, both of which are easily observed, to infer the quality of the clinical dimensions of care,
thus offering few avenues for truly disruptive innovators to
attract market share. There also may be no conflict between
the disruptive strategy and the core strategy of traditional
providers. Mark Pauly advanced a similar argument recently, suggesting that SSHs and RCs may be insufficient to
foster change without concomitant changes in financing,
organization, and regulation.29 Indeed, the emergence of
SSHs, ASCs, and RCs can be viewed as a response to the
constraints and opportunities implied by the current financing, organizational, and regulatory regimes of hospitals
and physicians.
This discussion can be summarized in the following argument: innovations such as SSHs, ASCs, and RCs are not
that disruptive to the business models of incumbent providers.
Strategic response of incumbents to disruptive
innovation
An alternative argument is that SSHs, ASCs, and RCs are
disruptive innovations that incumbents nevertheless adapt
to and counter. Indeed, strategy theory and research suggest
that disruptive innovations do not always displace the incumbents. Schumpeter himself noted that large incumbents
with capital and market power are in a strong position to
exploit new innovation.30 Chandler likewise noted that scale
and scope economies may provide incumbents with competitive advantages over new entrants.31 Teece argued that
firms in possession of specialized complementary assets (eg,
access to distribution channels, complementary technologies)
and other dynamic capabilities may renew, augment, and
adapt their core competencies over time.32,33 Mitchell provided empirical support for Teece’s views in a study of the
diagnostic imaging industry: incumbent manufacturers with
strong sales/service networks were less likely to be disrupted by competence-destroying innovations.34
Incumbents may successfully confront disruption in other
ways beyond developing new competencies. Following
strategic adaptation theory, the firm’s performance is a
function of the alignment between its external environment
and its strategy and internal organization.35–41 External
changes that undermine this alignment and the firm’s per-
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formance—such as disruptive innovations—require the firm
to reorient its strategy and reconfigure its operations to
achieve a better fit with its environment and thereby ensure
its viability and performance.
Over the past half century health care providers have
demonstrated their historical ability to reorient their strategies and operations to confront disruptive models of health
care financing and delivery. Starting in the 1950s and especially during the 1980s–1990s, physicians developed independent practitioner association models of health
maintenance organizations (HMOs) to combat the group and
staff model HMOs developed by the Kaiser Permanente
Medical Group and the Group Health Cooperative. Beginning in the 1970s, nonprofit hospitals developed federated
multihospital systems to combat the perceived threat of the
investor-owned hospital chains. In the 1990s, hospitals engaged in local market combinations and integrated delivery
networks (IDNs) to combat the growing concentration of
insurers, price discounting, and the disruption caused by
capitated payment. During the 1990s, hospitals also sought
to mitigate the disruption caused by managed care organizations by developing their own in-house health plans. Such
plans failed miserably in most cases.42 In all of these instances, the response has been strategic and/or organizational reconfiguration to play a smothering defense against
the disrupter.
It is possible that incumbent providers might play a
smothering defense against SSHs, ASCs, and RCs through a
series of strategic adaptations. These can include keeping
disrupters out of the market, effectively imitating the disrupters by offering the same innovations as ancillary services, or developing new organizational models to align with
physicians. Incumbents might also pare down their services
(eg, those that do not generate net revenues) in order to
imitate the disrupter and/or to bolster funding for services
that directly compete with the disrupter.
These considerations lead to a second alternative argument: potentially disruptive innovations fail to disrupt the
market when incumbents strategically adapt to the new entrants and defend their competitive positions by developing
new organizational arrangements.
Methods
A field study to evaluate these two arguments was commissioned by the Center for Health Management Research
(CHMR), a consortium of hospital systems affiliated with the
American Hospital Association and its Hospital Research
and Educational Trust. CHMR representatives, including
hospital clinicians and executives, funded the study to better
understand the possible threat posed by SSHs, ASCs, and
RCs. The study was thus initiated under the belief that disruptive organizational innovations might actually be disruptive.
The study rests on a comparative case analysis of 6 hospital systems and 2 disruptive innovation firms across the
country. The comparative case design provides the investigators with a level of detail about each case’s historical and
institutional context that is impossible to achieve in studies
that rely on large, nationally representative data sets. The
sample, drawn from CHMR member hospital systems, encompasses nonprofit systems from the East Coast, Midwest,
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and West Coast (see Table 1 for a description of the 6 hospital
markets). The authors conducted structured interviews with
chief executive officers (CEOs) and clinicians in each of the
hospital systems and CEOs in the disrupter firms. The researchers interviewed 3–4 individuals from each hospital.
The interviews focused on the perceived impact of disruptive
innovation on hospitals and their relationships with physicians, and the hospitals’ strategic responses to the disrupters,
including their provision of less profitable services.
The researchers conducted content analyses of the interviews for each hospital to develop a profile of the hospital’s
strategic response to the disruptive innovations. We did not,
however, seek to code or tabulate the interview data, given
the small number of respondents from each site. The study is
thus largely qualitative, much in the manner of the site interviews conducted by researchers at the Center for Studying
Health System Change.23 It is widely acknowledged that
such evidence helps one to understand and explain market
dynamics and the patterns observed in empirical studies.
Results
Impact of SSHs and hospitals’ competitive response
To understand the possible impact of SSHs, one first needs
to understand which physicians set them up and why. Our
research suggests that SSHs are set up by ‘‘splitter physicians’’—physicians who split their inpatient activity across
several hospitals. By virtue of splitting and retaining privileges with multiple hospitals, these physicians keep switching costs low and their bargaining power vis-à-vis any given
hospital high. They are less loyal to any single hospital and
more loyal to themselves by virtue of keeping their feet in
several institutions and minimizing their dependence on any
1 institution. Hospital executives estimate that splitters account for less than 20% of their hospitals’ admissions. The
class of splitter physicians is fragmented, encompassing a
large number of physicians with different perspectives and
loyalties. They do not act in unison.
Typically, splitter physicians establish SSHs because they
want (a) decision-making control over operating room equipment, supplies, staff, training, and availability; (b) predictable
operating schedules; and (c) freedom of choice of the latest
devices without any hospital pushback. SSHs are not estab-

lished to appeal to customers at the lower end of the market
who are not currently served by general medical-surgical
hospitals, nor are they established to offer a different set of
performance attributes to consumers not offered by traditional hospitals. Instead, they offer a different set of benefits
(decision-making control) to a different customer class (specialist physicians). Those physicians refer a different set of
(not so sick) patients who may not need the technological
backup of traditional settings. These performance differences
(ie, potential quality differences) between the traditional and
disruptive sites are not the advertised advantage of the SSHs
and may be opaque to consumers.
Thus, at first glance, SSHs do not appear to share the
characteristics of disruptive technologies. Because the SSH
founders are splitters, the hospitals never really had their
loyalty anyway. The establishment of an SSH thus further
splits the splitter physician’s volume, leaving the hospital
with a fraction of its original fraction. At the same time,
however, SSHs have historically been viewed as a threat by
general hospitals, as evidenced by hospitals’ lobbying for a
moratorium on SSH construction and the American Hospital
Association’s negative review of their impact. SSHs do not
exert a large impact on general hospitals’ volume, but can
adversely affect their case mix by virtue of cream skimming
the healthier (and presumably less expensive) patients.
Regardless of how disruptive SSHs really are, strategic
adaptations undertaken by incumbents can either diminish
their impact (by virtue of diluting the market share and
weakening the cash flow of competitors), offset their impact
(by business development or growth of other surgical volumes), or mitigate their impact (by the physician’s continued
interdependence with the hospital).
The threat of SSHs is also reduced by a series of existing
and emerging entry barriers and countervailing forces. First,
certificate of need (CON) laws found in a majority of states
may actively restrict new hospital entry via enforcement
actions or passively serve as a deterrent if still on the books.
Second, the moratorium imposed on construction of SSHs by
the Federal Government during 2003–2004 while it studied
the SSH impact further retarded entry, as did the uncertainty
regarding future federal legislation or regulation that might
have come as a result of this study. Third, some states have
regulations covering new program development that

Table 1. Descriptive Statistics on Hospital Systems and Markets
Hospital System
Nonprofit
Religious
Major Teaching
Region
Hospital Market Share (Beds)
Hospital Market Share (Admissions)
Market
HHI (Beds)
HHI (Admissions)
Population 2000 (thousand)
Population 2008 (thousand)
Specialty Hospitals in Market

Market 1

Market 2

Market 3

Market 4

Market 5

Market 6

H

H

H

H
H

H

H

Pacific
<10%
<10%

Pacific
<10%
10%–19%

H
Mid-Atlantic
40%–49%
40%–49%

Southwest
20%–29%
20%–29%

Southwest
20%–29%
20%–29%

H
Midwest
<10%
<10%

<1000
<1000
500–1000
500–1000
0

<1000
<1000
1000–1999
1000–1999
0

2000–2999
2000–2999
<500
<500
0

1000–1999
1000–1999
<500
500–1000
1 (Heart)

1000–1999
1000–1999
<500
500–1000
1 (Heart)

<1000
<1000
>2000
>2000
1 (Ortho)

Sources: American Hospital Association FY 2006; US Census Bureau
HHI, Herfindahl-Hitschmann Index
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lengthen the approval process for new hospitals. Fourth, in
states like California, seismic requirements and nurse staffing
mandates have increased the cost of building and operating
new hospitals like SSHs. Fifth, in some markets, SSH entry
was blocked by incumbent hospitals and their close ties with
health plans, which refused to contract with new entrants.
Sixth, in those markets where SSH chains did succeed with
entry, their entry spurred the consolidation of fragmented
hospital cardiology programs, leading to some program exits
and stronger countervailing forces among incumbent medical-surgical hospitals.
Even with successful entry, some SSHs suffer from selfinflicted (strategic and internal) operating problems that
have limited their impact in the market. For example, a large
volume of cardiology patients who might be targeted by
SSHs come through the emergency department (ED) at
community hospitals. Cardiologists who are at once SSH
investors and practitioners at those community hospitals still
have to treat them there. In addition, many primary care
physicians and referring cardiologists want their patients to
go to community hospitals where they are used to referring
and admitting, and not to the SSHs. Some physician-entrepreneurs who entered new markets made business mistakes
that hampered their competitive position, such as buying
former medical-surgical hospitals that had closed in order to
avoid CON laws. Such hospitals were much larger than
normal SSHs and had large fixed costs to support, limiting
the returns that physician-investors could earn. More generally, SSHs with physician-investors might often implode
due to inflated expectations regarding earnings, Stark II
limits on the profits that outside investors can glean from
new ventures, and the ease of obtaining managed care contracts. Such contracts are more difficult to obtain because of
closed-panel networks, selective contracting, hospital diversification into health plans, close ties between hospital and
health plan executives in some markets, and the small size of
SSHs, which limits their bargaining power with payers. As
testimony to the strength of these payer barriers, one hospital
reported that when it bought a majority interest in a struggling SSH in its market, that facility benefited from the
community hospital’s reimbursement staff, contracts, and
billing mechanisms. The SSH’s census grew as a result of
coverage under more payer contracts and enjoyed a 40%
increase in payer rates. This growth reflects the power of the
general hospital system’s contracts more than the efficiency
and quality of the SSH. Freestanding SSHs would likely not
enjoy such growth in this market, as evidenced by history.
According to hospital executives, the real threat is when
competitor medical-surgical hospitals set up their own SSHs
(eg, a cardiac center of excellence, or cardiac hospital within
a hospital). In these instances, the SSH enjoys built-in access
to existing referral streams from the ED or community
physicians. Indeed, this strategy is a popular response by
community hospitals to SSH entry.
Community hospitals engage in several other strategies to
respond to the threat of SSHs. Hospitals may seek other uses
for excess bed capacity via business development (‘‘grow like
crazy’’), or engage in strategies to retain their surgeons’ inpatient volume and lose some outpatient volume. Hospitals
may compete by seeking to improve quality or consolidate
cardiac volumes by merging with (or affiliating with) programs at former rivals’ facilities. Another set of strategies
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involves increasing the salaries of cardiac nurses so that they
do not defect, or improving related hospital services such as
the catheterization lab, cardiology, cardiovascular surgery,
and the ED. Finally, hospitals may engage in strategies to
raise their rivals’ costs by lobbying the state legislature to
maintain CON, push for state moratoria on new hospital
construction, or informally encourage health plans to keep
network panels closed and contracts selective.
Hospital executives report that the threat of SSH entry has
imposed costs that are not widely recognized. One downside
of SSHs is that they siphon off management time and attention in order to monitor SSH development. SSHs are as
much a distraction as a threat. Another cost to incumbent
hospitals is that the threat of SSH entry can also favor the
physicians’ relative bargaining position with their incumbent
hospitals because physicians’ threats to defect to a SSH
jeopardize the hospital’s revenues and profits. This may be
why community hospitals have found it necessary to invest
in medical technologies, emphasize nurse retention, and offer
a variety of hospital services.
Not all physician groups and medical specialties benefit
equally from the threat of SSH entry, however, as it provides
the leadership of the incumbent hospital political cover to
shrink or close unprofitable service lines by claiming that the
profits used for cross-subsidization are no longer there.
Impact of ASCs and hospitals’ competitive response
As with SSHs, one needs to understand the stressors on
the physicians who eventually set up ASCs in order to understand their potential impact. One set of stressors concerns
coverage. It is well known that physicians are increasingly
less willing to take call in the ED. Hospitals may also need
specialist coverage in their busy trauma center, in an orthopedics center set up in an indigent area, or in the hospital’s
own ASC to help supervise residents. All 3 cases require the
hospital’s physicians to be in more locations doing procedures there, which the latter find distracting from their regular practice. Moreover, physicians may say they cannot
handle 2–3 hour sessions in these settings and thus refuse to
donate their time.
Another set of stressors concerns surgeons’ access to
hospital operating rooms (ORs). Although many hospitals
are expanding the number of ORs or building their own
ASCs, they cannot respond as quickly as physicians or
outside entrepreneurs. Executives report that physicians
can build ASCs faster than hospitals can put in new ORs.
Finally, surgeons pursue other objectives in developing
their own ASCs: increased income, ownership, control over
OR access, and scheduling convenience. Although surgeons
are reportedly otherwise happy with their hospitals, they
are perhaps some of the least satisfied members of the
medical staff.43
Physician development of ASCs is not a big issue for many
of the larger hospitals. One reason is that hospitals have
competing agendas (‘‘bigger fish to fry’’). These include the
installation of electronic medical records, developing their
medical networks, customer focus and other transformational change initiatives, six sigma efforts to improve patient
flow, revenue cycle management, controlling physician
preference items and other supply chain management issues,
and rate negotiations with payers.
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Hospitals are also quick to point out several hazards in
ASC development. First, ASCs are a volume business. Some
hospital executives admitted that they made the mistake of
building too many ASCs, especially with the same set of
physician investors. The result was low volume at each site.
Second, hospitals can seek to joint venture with physicians in
ASC start-ups; however, the hospital’s 40% interest does not
make up for the loss of 90% of its own ambulatory surgery
volume to the start-up. Hospitals often rationalize that they
would lose this business anyway, and so the joint venture
allows it to retain something. However, executives state that
they still do not know if this is really true. Regardless, many
hospitals report that it takes a long time and a lot of investment to backfill the lost outpatient volume at the hospital.
At the same time, hospitals suggest that ASC competition
is, by nature, limited. ASCs tend to perform procedures in
lower end areas such as endoscopy; ear, nose, and throat;
and ophthalmology. They tend to do much less volume in
higher end cases such as cardiology, plastic surgery, general
surgery, and orthopedics. In some cases when orthopedists
have set up an ASC, hospitals have experienced a drop in
outpatient orthopedic cases; however, the ASC may add a
spine surgeon to its roster who ultimately admits more spine
cases to the hospital. Hospitals report they have witnessed
less of a volume drop in the higher end cases, but do see
overall lower growth rates in outpatient surgery volumes
and some cherry-picking of lower severity cases by outside
ASCs. Another limiting factor is that ASCs are often set up
by splitters, who thus partially reduce their fraction of the
hospital’s volume. As with SSHs, ASCs may also suffer from
overly optimistic expectations. Hospital executives report
that although ASCs are profitable, they typically do not meet
their forecasted revenue targets. The ASC threat is also
mitigated by 2 other factors. In markets with more than 1
large orthopedic group, hospitals do not ‘‘face a union’’ and
thus have competing groups to negotiate with. Second, in
markets with sufficient patient demand, orthopedists at
ASCs prefer to retain a share in the overall inpatient volume,
recognize their interdependence with the hospital and the
halo effect of the hospital’s service on their own practice, and
thus reportedly have an incentive to ‘‘act in a civil manner.’’
ASCs do pose a real threat to rural hospitals or smaller
community hospitals that derive a larger percentage of their
revenue from elective outpatient surgery. This is consistent
with earlier evidence that smaller hospitals with high outpatient volume have lower marginal costs and higher margins for outpatient care: such hospitals find it costlier to lose
their outpatient business to disruptive innovators.44 The ASC
threat is thus more acute for community hospital volume
than for referral or tertiary volume. ASCs also are a more
acute threat than SSHs in that they are easier to set up, yet
engage in the same cream skimming practice, leaving community hospitals with the higher severity cases but no higher
reimbursement. Multispecialty ASCs pose a bigger threat to
hospital outpatient volumes than do single-specialty ASCs.
ASCs established by a core orthopedic group as part of a
larger facility can also expand into an SSH or ‘‘human performance center’’ that can entice other specialists away to
colocate on their campus. The facility thus serves as an ASC
with wraparound services. ASCs established by large nephrology groups to serve dialysis patients can lead to lost
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volume and revenue for the hospital’s vascular surgeons.
The threat is increased if the group also adds a transplant
surgeon to perform kidney transplants.
Hospital responses to ASCs take many forms, both proactive and defensive. On the proactive side, most hospitals
seek to increase their OR capacity, and seek to do so as
quickly as possible to discourage physician entrepreneurship. Many hospitals have attempted to coordinate surgery
with large physician groups (eg, link up the 2 parties’ ambulatory, inpatient, and ASC surgery schedules) in order to
free up both physician and OR time for others. Some hospitals have made block time in their ORs available to key
orthopedic groups to increase the hospital’s attractiveness, or
have allowed certain high-volume orthopedists to work 2
hospital ORs simultaneously a few days a month to increase
the latter’s surgical volume. Other hospitals work with
loyal physician groups to (a) develop a joint venture around
an ASC (and maybe later on around an SSH with a comanagement model), (b) invest in buildings on the hospital
campus to attract additional surgeons, boosting hospital
volume and keeping surgical business at hospital, (c) build
new hospital facilities where the group purchases floors
and performs its own imaging, or (d) colocate an orthopedic
ASC and SSH site that allows for a smooth transition from
inpatient to outpatient care, and to increase physicians’
convenience and productivity. Finally, hospitals can help to
support physician group expansion by paying a portion of a
new hire’s salary (eg, spine surgeon, traumatologist) to help
staff the hospital’s trauma unit and keep the group engaged
with the hospital.
On the defensive side, hospitals often engage in various
business development activities such as bringing in more
surgeons to increase inpatient surgery volume to offset lost
volume to ASCs, backfilling the lost specialty volume with
other specialties, transferring lower revenue cases to hospital
outpatient surgical venues to free up more inpatient surgical
capacity for higher end cases (eg, neurosurgery), or attracting
patients from outside the region (who tend to be higher severity cases with higher rates of reimbursement). All of these
business development activities take time, however. Hospitals also may partner with an outside national ASC development firm to build several ASCs to thwart other firms
from entering the market. Many hospitals also have developed centers of excellence (COE) in orthopedics in order to
retard orthopedists’ efforts to develop an SSH or ASC. The
presence of a COE may explain why orthopedists have been
slow to set up their own ASC. Hospitals may partner with
the surgeon group in a joint venture just to maintain the
relationship and/or minimize the loss of volume and revenue to the outside facility.
Impact of RCs and hospitals’ competitive response
In interviews, hospital executives and clinicians also suggested that the threat to hospitals posed by RCs is limited.
While hospitals may lose nurse practitioners who are recruited away to staff RC operations, they have received no
complaints from their primary care physicians, perceived no
competition with their primary care physician network, and
witnessed no impact on their EDs. The low impact may reflect the RCs’ appeal to uninsured patients, which represent
new business. The impact of RCs on primary care physicians
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is likely to be low in markets with primary care physician
shortages and closed primary care physician practices, and
where RCs have developed referral relationships with local
hospital systems and their primary care physician networks.
Indeed, RCs may actually serve as an extension of primary
care physician offices for after-hours care. Some pediatricians
complain that RCs limit their ability to cross-subsidize other
services rendered to patients (eg, responding to phone calls
and e-mails) for which they are reimbursed less.
Hospitals appear to have responded to RCs in different
ways: make, ally, or deny. Some hospitals and IDNs—like
Geisinger and Aurora (neither of which were inteviewed)—
have developed their own RCs. Others have developed informal alliances with existing RCs to develop referral relationships. Still others dismiss RCs altogether. Those who
have launched their own RCs offer several rationales. RCs
are viewed as a response to consumerism, as a strategy to
increase patient convenience, as a possible source of referrals
to the hospital’s own physicians, as a relief of bottlenecks for
busy physician clinics and acute-care centers, and as a
backup to the IDN’s physician network.
RCs strongly resemble the ‘‘doc-in-a-box’’ models developed during the 1970s, and they may share the same fate as
well. One large RC provider, CVS Caremark, recently announced plans to close 90 of its 550 MinuteClinic locations
until a seasonal need (such as the flu) arises. Part of this move
stems from less-than-expected demand. Another potential
problem facing RCs is the growing interest of state legislators
to regulate these clinics and limit their expansion.45
Finally, like the doc-in-a-box models and physician
practice management companies of the 1990s, RCs may need
a large number of clinics within a market to develop good
contracting with payers and to gain scale economies.
Impact of disruptive innovations on hospitals’ provision
of low-margin services
Overall, the interviews suggest that SSHs, ASCs, and RCs
pose only modest disruptions to incumbent providers but
still evoke strategic responses (both offensive and defensive).
One set of strategic adaptations that we have not considered
are changes in hospital service mix away from low-margin
clinical areas to higher margin areas that subsidize them and
are the targets of the disrupters. To the extent that they occur,
such investment shifts suggest an effort by incumbents to
imitate the disrupters and bolster funding of service lines to
compete with them. To investigate this possibility, we asked
incumbents about their investments in 2 relatively unprofitable services: psychiatric and burn services.
General medical-surgical hospitals have historically ignored psychiatric services. Such services are often reimbursed
below cost and thus require greater infusions of outside capital than more profitable services. They can also be difficult to
staff because of the lack of hospital investment in these areas
and the hospital’s reliance on community physicians (thus
avoiding the need to hire a full-time unit chief ). Executives
state that these services are not entirely cross-subsidized by
more profitable business lines and high hospital margins.
Low-margin services are also supported by the hospital’s
mission, donations and foundation support, and investments
by the corporate parent in multihospital systems. Nor are
these services always unprofitable. In some markets, the burn
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and trauma cases can be profitable when the patients are
predominantly insured victims in motor vehicle accidents.
Current hospital trends may increase the pressure on psychiatric services. Several hospital executives reported that
there is now a move to push these services outside the medical-surgical facilities within a system and make them more
self-sufficient. One reason is that inpatient beds are expensive
to maintain, and psychiatric services may be a poor use for
those beds because they have small patient volumes and big
difficulties in covering their overhead costs. As a result, some
systems are now establishing freestanding psychiatric hospitals to house these services. Hospital executives now also realize that mental health disorders play a major role in the
health status of many of their patients, who get ‘‘lost’’ in the
midst of the system’s inpatient and outpatient specialty care.
As a result, hospitals are seeking to gain greater control over
the health of psychiatric patients and get their treatment back
in the hands of primary care physicians. It is unclear how
primary care physicians will be compensated for treating
these disorders and where they will find the time to do so.
Nevertheless, psychiatric and burn care services do not
seem to have been greatly impacted by disruptive innovations such as SSHs and ASCs. Faced with fiscal problems,
hospitals have elected to do ‘‘across-the-board’’ cuts rather
than cuts in less profitable services. Unprofitable services
tend to be managed by shortening length of stay, developing
discharge capabilities, and reducing supply costs (eg, pharmaceuticals)—similar to the comanagement models used by
hospitals to work with clinicians in other service lines. Indeed, in some hospitals the least profitable services can be
lucrative areas (orthopedics, spine, neurosurgery) that are
poorly managed and have lousy vendor contracts, all of
which can be rectified by a shift to comanagement models
with joint hospital-physician bargaining with suppliers. Finally, there is anecdotal evidence from some hospital systems that commitment to less profitable services is fostered
by the long tenure and commitment to psychiatric care by
both the CEO and the chief of psychiatry.
Limitations
This article has analyzed the impact of 3 types of disruptive technologies on incumbents in local provider markets.
We have not studied the full range of organizational models
that might alter health care delivery such as telemedicine or
medical tourism, nor have we studied technology-based
disrupters such as personalized medicine or broader forms of
disruption recently discussed by Brook.46
Our findings are subject to several other limitations. The
data presented here are based on interviews rather than
empirical analysis of competitive effects. They are also partially based on interviews with incumbents, who might be
prone to deny or minimize the disruption taking place before
their eyes. The comparative case design suffers from obvious
threats to both internal and external validity. Finally, in an
attempt to draw generalizations, we have aggregated very
different types of disruptive innovations, obscuring some
important differences between them. It is easier to compare
hospitals to SSHs and ASCs, as they are all institutional
structures; the larger RC companies, however, are dissimilar
from the predominantly independently-owned primary care
offices with whom they compete in terms of both organization
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and resource capacity (by virtue of their investment in
technology and use of standardized protocols).
Discussion
Our findings provide qualitative evidence to complement
the growing body of empirical evidence on the effects of some
of these innovations. This qualitative evidence is consistent
with the quantitative findings and conclusions regarding the
competitive impacts of SSHs, ASCs, and RCs reviewed earlier.
Second, our findings seriously challenge the previously
held notion that these new organizational models disrupt
traditional health care delivery. Executives and clinicians from
the incumbent hospitals in markets where the new models
have arisen do not seem particularly concerned about the
potential disruption, and not because they ignore or denigrate
the latter. Rather, the incumbents recognize that the new
models have not demonstrated any real competitive advantage in terms of cost or quality and have not taken away
significant market share. One of the trumpeted features of
disruptive innovation—improved quality—has not been
manifest. Moreover, for at least 1 of the innovations studied
here (RCs), there are signs that the disrupters are scaling back
their entry strategy and closing down some of their sites.
The incumbents also point out that some of these new
models (SSHs, ASCs) have not necessarily targeted new
segments of customers not served by the incumbents, but
have cherry-picked the favorable risks among existing customers. Given this risk-selection strategy, it is therefore also
difficult to argue that they provide lower cost care at a
comparable level of quality. That is, there is no evidence of
disruption by virtue of tackling the ‘‘iron triangle’’ or ‘‘triple
aim’’ of health care (ie, reducing cost without harming
quality or access, or improving quality or access without
raising costs). The evidence for retail clinics is different in this
regard; despite the favorable patient selection, clinics appear
to lower costs without sacrificing quality. However, the
clinics’ business model may serve only a narrow customer
segment that cannot migrate upward to consume more
mainstream health care services.
There are other reasons to question the disruptive character of these organizational models. Two of the 3 (ie, SSHs,
ASCs) are staffed by the same physicians found in incumbent
settings. Thus, while the sites of care have changed, there is
no substitution of lower for higher cost personnel and procedures. There is also no evidence that incumbents really
ignore these models. Indeed, many incumbents have incorporated these models into their service offerings, co-opting
the disrupters in the process. Moreover, the incumbents do
not seem to have incurred financial losses by developing
their own version of these organizational models, and do not
express any conflicts between these models and their core
strategies. Finally, the incumbents have sometimes stifled the
potential competitive threat posed by potentially disruptive
models by keeping or driving them out of the market.
Third, our study suggests several noteworthy observations about the workings of organizational innovations in
health care besides the possibility that they are not that
disruptive. We have noted that the disruption might be
limited to certain types of incumbents (eg, rural or small
urban hospitals) and certain types of disrupters (multispecialty ASCs). Indeed, we have found that, at least among
SSHs, the most disruptive models are those developed by the
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incumbents. We have also found that the disrupters might
themselves be disrupted by their own strategic blunders
and/or internal operating problems. Researchers should
therefore focus on the implementation and execution of the
disruption strategy. Finally, we have found that the models
analyzed here are disruptive in different ways than imagined; they distract rather than displace incumbents.
Overall, our findings lend some support to both of our
arguments. If true, where might the disruption to health care
delivery (if it ever comes) originate? In recent years, the supposedly disruptive effects of new technologies, such as genomics and personalized medicine, have failed to materialize.
Another possible source may be changes in insurance and
payment, such as consumer-directed health plans (CDHPs)
and the push for ‘‘bundled payments’’ (eg, combined Part A
and B under Medicare) to organized systems of care. To date,
CDHPs have failed significantly to penetrate the insured
market and show similar signs of favorable selection. Bundled
payments are being rolled out shortly under Medicare’s Acute
Care Episode demonstration. Other disruptions encapsulated
in the various health reform bills considered by Congress in
the Fall of 2009 have disappeared from the final legislation.
In sum, waiting for disruption may be like waiting for
Godot. According to Mark Pauly, this situation will continue
until people are willing to admit that they would rather save
money than save quality.31 The US health care industry is
known for being resistant to change. We suggest that it is
resistant even to the dynamic forces that lead to disruptive
change in other industries.
Author Disclosure Statement
Drs. Burns, David, and Helmchen have no conflicts of financial interest.
This study was funded by The Center for Health Management Research (CHMR).
Acknowledgments
We wish to thank the Center for Health Management
Research (CHMR) members, Doug Conrad, PhD, and Tom
Rundall, PhD, for their support and suggestions for this
project. We also thank Phil Saynisch, Amol Navathe, and
Andrea Millman for their research assistance, and Mark
Pauly, PhD, for his comments on this paper.
References
1. Schumpter JA. The Theory of Economic Development. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; 1934.
2. Hwang J, Christensen CM. Disruptive innovation in health
care delivery: A framework for business-model innovation.
Health Aff 2008;27:1329–1335.
3. Christensen CM, Grossman JH, Hwang J. How to heal the
health care system. http://www.forbes.com/forbes/2008/
1117/097.html. Accessed May 31, 2010.
4. Smith MD. Disruptive innovation: Can health care learn
from other industries? A conversation with Clayton M.
Christensen. Health Aff Web Exclusive March 13;2007;
w288–w295.
5. Christensen CM, Johnson MW, Rigby DK. Foundations for
growth: How to identify and build disruptive new businesses. Sloan Management Rev 2002 Spring;22–31.
6. Christensen CM, Raynor M, Verlinden M. Skate to where the
money will be. Harv Bus Rev 2001;79:73–81.

STRATEGIC RESPONSE BY PROVIDERS
7. Christensen CM, Bohmer R, Kenagy J. Will disruptive innovations cure health care? Harv Bus Rev 2000;78:102–112.
8. Christensen CM, Grossman JH, Hwang J. The Innovator’s
Prescription: A Disruptive Solution for Health Care. New York,
NY; McGraw-Hill; 2009.
9. Glabman M. Disruptive innovations that will change your
life in health care. Manag Care 2009;18:12–21.
10. Irwin G, Kleiner A, Choudhury S. When disruptive integration comes to health care. http://www.strategy-business.com/article/00020?pg¼0. Accessed May 31, 2010.
11. Mehrotra A, Liu H, Adams JL, et al. Comparing costs and
quality of care at retail clinics with that of other medical settings
for 3 common illnesses. Ann Intern Med 2009;151:321–328.
12. Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS). CMS
study of physician-owned specialty hospitals required in
Section 507(c)(2) of the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement and Modernization Act of 2003. http://www
.heartland.org/custom/semod_policybot/pdf/19681.pdf.
Accessed May 31, 2010.
13. Ahmed A, Fincham JE. Physician office vs. retail clinic: Patient preferences in care seeking for minor illnesses. Ann
Fam Med 2010;8:117–123.
14. Woodburn JD, Smith KL, Nelson G. Quality of care in the
retail health care setting using national clinical guidelines for
acute pharyngitis. Am J Med Qual 2007;22:457–462.
15. Thygeson M. Retail clinics. Cost saving, or just convenient?
Presented at: Roundtable on Evidence-Based Medicine, Institute of Medicine; Washington, DC; July 16–17, 2009.
16. Hollingsworth JM, Ye Z, Strope SA, Krein SL, Hollenbeck
AT, Hollenbeck BK. Physician-ownership of ambulatory
surgery centers linked to higher volume of surgeries. Health
Affairs 2010;29:683–689.
17. Tynan A, November E, Lauer J, Pham H, Cram P. General
hospitals, specialty hospitals and financially vulnerable patients. http://www.hschange.org/CONTENT/1056/. Accessed May 31, 2010.
18. Schneider JE, Ohsfeldt RL, Morrisey MA, Li P, Miller TR,
Zellner BA. Effects of specialty hospitals on the financial
performance of general hospitals, 1997–2004. Inquiry 2007;
44:321–334.
19. Carey K, Burgess JF, Young GJ. Specialty and full-service
hospitals: A comparative cost analysis. Health Serv Res
2008;43(part 2):1869–1887.
20. Chukmaitov AS, Menachemi N, Brown LS, Saunders C, Brooks
RG. A comparative study of quality outcomes in freestanding
ambulatory surgery centers and hospital-based outpatient departments: 1997–2004. Health Serv Res 2008;43:1485–1504.
21. Gabel JR, Fahlman C, Kang R, Wozniak G, Kletke P, Hay JH.
Where do I send thee? Does physician-ownership affect referral patterns to ambulatory surgery centers? Health Aff
Web Exclusive, March 18, 2008: w165–w174.
22. Winter A. Comparing the mix of patients in various outpatient surgery settings. Health Aff 2003;22:68–75.
23. Casalino LP, Devers KJ, Brewster LR. Focused factories?
Physician-owned specialty hospitals. Health Aff 2003;22:
56–67.
24. Thygeson M, Van Voorst KA, Maciosek MV, Solberg L. Use
and costs of care in retail clinics versus traditional care sites.
Health Aff 2008;27:1283–1292.
25. Rohrer JE, Angsman KB, Bartel GA. Impact of retail medicine on standard costs in primary care: A semiparametric
analysis. Pop Health Manag 2009;12:333–335.
26. Szafran O, Bell NR. Use of walk-in clinics by rural and urban
patients. Can Fam Physician 2000;46:114–119.

77
27. Campbell MK, Silver RW, Hoch JS, et al. Re-utilization
outcomes and costs of minor acute illness treated at family
physician offices, walk-in clinics, and emergency departments. Can Fam Physician 2005;51:82–83.
28. Mehrotra A, Wang MC, Lave JR, Adams JL, McGlynn EA.
Retail clinics, primary care physicians, and emergency departments: A comparison of patients’ visits. Health Aff
2008;27:1272–1282.
29. Pauly M. ‘We aren’t quite as good but we sure are cheap’:
Prospects for disruptive innovation in medical care and insurance markets. Health Aff (Milwood) 2008;27:1349–1352.
30. Schumpter JA. Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy. New
York, NY: Harper Brothers; 1950.
31. Chandler AD. Scale and Scope: The Dynamics of Industrial
Capitalism. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; 1990.
32. Teece D. Profiting from technological innovation: Implications for integration, collaboration, licensing and public
policy. Res Policy 1986;15:285–305.
33. Teece D, Pisano G, Schuen. Dynamic capabilities and strategic management. Strateg Manag J 1997;18:509–533.
34. Mitchell W. Are more good things better, or will technical
and market capabilities conflict when a firm expands? Ind
Corp Change 1992;1:327–346.
35. Schendel D, Hofer C. Strategic Management: A New View of Business Policy and Planning. Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Co; 1979.
36. Chakravarthy BS. Adaptation: A promising metaphor for
strategic management. Acad Manag Rev 1982;7:35–44.
37. Shortell SM, Morrison EM, Friedman B. Strategic Choices for
America’s Hospitals: Managing Change in Turbulent Times. San
Francisco: Jossey-Bass; 1990.
38. Kimberly JR, Zajac EJ. Strategic adaptation in health care
organizations: implications for theory and research. Med
Care Rev 1985;42(2):267–302.
39. Schindehutt M, Morris M. Understanding strategic adaptation in small firms. Int J Entrepren Behav Res 2001;7:84–107.
40. Jennings P. Strategic adaptation: A uni or multi dimensional
concept?’’ Strategic Change 2004;13:1–10.
41. Burns LR, Shah RJ, Sloan FA, Powell A. The impact of
hospital ownership conversions: Results from a comparative
field study. Biennial Rev Health Care Manag Meso Perspect
2009;8:171–229.
42. Burns LR, Thorpe DP. Why provider-sponsored health plans
don’t work. Healthc Financ Manag 2001;suppl:12–16.
43. Burns LR, Muller RW. Hospital-physician collaboration:
Landscape of economic integration and impact on clinical
integration. Milbank Q 2008;86:375–434.
44. Grannemann TW, Brown RS, Pauly MV. Estimating hospital
costs: A multiple-output analysis. J Health Econ 1986;5:107–127.
45. National Conference of State Legislatures. Retail health
clinics: State legislation and laws. http://www.ncsl.org/
programs/health/retailclinics. htm. Accessed April 24, 2009.
46. Brook RH. Disruption and innovation in health care. JAMA
2009;302:1465–1466.

Address correspondence to:
Lawton R. Burns, PhD, MBA
The James Joo-Jin Kim Professor
Department of Health Care Management
The Wharton School
University of Pennsylvania
3641 Locust Walk
Philadelphia, PA 19104
E-mail: burnsL@wharton.upenn.edu

